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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RISING THE RETIREMENT AGE:





In most developed countries, pension systems have been facing longer life spans and lower birth
rates. Almost without exception, political decision makers have responded by increasing the legal re-
tirement age (the age when workers are entitled to collect their full retirement pension); by increasing
the contributions to the pension funds; and by restricting the access to early retirement.
1
Despite its importance, there is very little research about the economic impact of these policies. This
essay investigates the legal change that occurred in the Portuguese labour market when, from 1994
onwards, the retirement age of women (initially set at 62) was gradually adjusted in order to converge
to the retirement age of men (65 throughout). We exploit the richness of the individual records of
“Inquérito ao Emprego” and “Quadros de Pessoal”, which also allowone to follow individuals and their
firms.
In this context, it is particularly insightful to draw on matching estimators, which can establish an accu-
rate comparison between the “treatment” groups (those individuals or firms subject to an intervention)
and the “control” group. We follow these procedures, in order to estimate the impact of the increased
retirement age of women upon their wages and hours worked. We also obtain estimates of the impact
of the reform upon the personnel policies (hiring and firing) of firms. Finally, we also evaluate the im-
pact of the higher retirement age upon the performance of the firms.
2. THE NEW LEGAL RETIREMENT AGE
In the early 1990s, the Portuguese social security system was facing the sustainability problems com-
mon in pay-as-you-go systems. These problems were related to the ageing of the population, as life
expectancy increased and as birth falls fell. In 1993, those aged 65 or more corresponded to 21.6% of
the active population (Banco de Portugal, 1994). In this context, the Portuguese government decided
toraisethelegalageofretirement(LAR)ofwomenfrom62to65years,makingthatequalbetweenthe
two sexes (“Decreto-Lei” 329/93). This law raised the retirement age by six months in every civil year,
up to 1999, when the two retirement ages converged (see Table 1). For instance, while a woman born
in 31st December1939wouldbe entitledto retire in 31st December1993(on the dayof her 62ndbirth-
day), a woman born one day later (1st January 1932) would only be eligible to collect her full pension
six months later, at 1st July 1994, when she would be 62 years and 6 months old. However, given the
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(1) Fourteen OECD countries have recently increased their retirement age and are gradually approaching that new level.gradual implementation of the increase in the LAR, womenaged 6 months later (1st July 1933), would
only reach their retirement age on the 1st July 1995 (when aged 63). The following analyses exploit
these gradual adjustments in the law as a source of identification of the impact of the increased LAR
upon the labour market.
There are two additional aspect of the pension system in Portugal that need to be taken into account.
The first one is that LAR refers to the age at which the worker is entitled to his/her retirement pension.
At that point in time, the labour contract between that worker and his/her employer expires, although
the worker can establish a new contract with the same (or a different) employer. The retirement earn-
ingsandtheworkearnings(inapossiblenewcontract)areindependent.The secondadditionalaspect
isthat thesocialsecuritysystemincludedsomeexceptionsto thestandardLAR,asinearlyretirement.
The most conspicuous cases concerned the long-term unemployed, workers in firms undergoing ma-
jor restructuring processes, and workers in particularly demanding jobs (e.g. air-traffic controllers),
thus limiting the impact of the new law.
3. IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
Given the non-experimental nature of the law reform, a quality of our evaluation depends crucially on
the quality of the groups used for the construction of counterfactuals. The following analysis selects
carefully control groups (counterfactuals) and follows simultaneously two methodologies that have
been suggested in the literature on non-experimental identification: difference-in-differences (Meyer,
1995) and matching (Rubin, 1977, and Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). These two methodologies are






it is impossible to observe in period t the value of individual i in both states. It is therefore impossible to




it. It is possible, however, to estimate the average
impact of treatment on the treated if there is a suitable control group.
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Table 1
TREATMENT GROUPS: BEFORE AND AFTER THE NEW LEGAL AGE OF RETIREMENT (LAR)
Treatment groups
Year: 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
LAR: 62 62.5 63 63.5 64 64.5 65
[57.5, 58) [64.5, 65)
[58, 58.5) [64, 64.5)
[58.5, 59) [63.5, 64)
[59, 59.5) [63, 63.5)
[59.5, 60) [62.5, 63)
[60, 60.5) [62, 62.5)The idea behind the difference-in-differences estimator is that once can use information from a group
of individuals that were not subject to the treatment in order to identify the time change in Y that is not
due to treatment, i.e. that would result from the simple time difference. The identification hypothesis in










in whicht’is the periodbefore the implementation of the program. This hypothesisstates that, through-
out time, the evolution in Y for the treated individuals (D=1), in the case in whichthey werenot treated,
wouldhavebeenthe same than the evolutionobservedfor the individualsthat werenot exposedto the
treatment (D=0). The difference-in-differences estimator provides estimates of the mean effect of
treatment on the treated and can be obtained from the sample moments in
DdD = { E[Yit | D=1]-E[Yit |D = 0 ]}–{E [ Y it’ | D=1] - E[Yit’ | D=0] }.
The limitations of this estimator are related to how comparable the two groups are in terms of their ob-
served characteristics. However, it is possible to combine this method with the matching method sug-
gested by Rubin (1977), in order to make sure that the groups share common characteristics by
removing from the sample those individuals whose characteristics are not common to the two groups
(only those in the common support are kept). The method that combines these two methodologies,
suggested by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) is known as difference-in-differences matching. The feasi-
bilityof this identificationstrategydependson the availabilityof a rich set of individualcharacteristicsin
the data, which in our case are present at both the individual- and the firm-level.
In the case of panel data, the DDM estimator takes the following form:








t’ |P )] ,
in which  E (
.| P) represents the expected value of the time change in Y for the individuals in the control
group that are statistically close to those in the treatment group (i.e. whose probability of participation
in the treatment, P, is also high). This probabilityis computed by a probit model (dichotomous depend-
ent variables), and conditioning the dependent variable (undertaking or not the treatment) upon indi-
vidual observed characteristics. It is possible to show that, if the selection to treatment is independent
on the potentialresult of the treatment, conditionallyon the observedcharacteristics,then conditioning
on P is equivalent, but computationally simpler. In practical terms, the first step of the procedure in-
volves estimating for each individual in the sample the difference in the behaviour over time (from t’to
t), so to compute the first differences (separately for the treatment and the control groups). In the sec-
ondstep, oneestimatesP, followingwhichonematchesunits inthetreatmentgroupto units inthecon-
trol group, in order to compute the (second) difference amongst comparable units. The mean of these
differences represents the mean impact of treatment upon the treated group.
4. DATA
The analysis of the impact of the new law exploits two data sets that allow one to follow workers and
firms over time. The impact upon the inactivity transition rates is based on the “Inquérito ao Emprego”
data set, from INE (Statistics Portugal). In this data set it is possible to follow workers over the 6 quar-
ters in which they are surveyed. The impact upon the wages and hours worked of the targeted women
and upon the flows of workers and firm performance are based on the “Quadros de Pessoal” data set
(Ministryof Employment).The latter data set includesmatched informationabout the worker(e.g. age,
schooling, tenure) and the firm (e.g. equity, sales, industry, firm size) over time, so that one can study
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each unit under analysis.
5. THE NEW LAW AND LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION
The extension of the length of activity for women is the most immediate impact of the new law. In fact,
the data confirm that the probability that a woman in the treatment group is employed increased by
31.1%withrespecttothegroupnotaffectedbythelaw.Symmetrically,theprobabilitythatsuchwoman
is inactive fell by 27.9%.
2 These values are further corroborated by the developments in the employ-
ment rates of women aged 62-65, from 23.2% in 1992 to 30.4% in 2000.
3 From these figures, one can
conclude that the newlawhad a significant impact upon the activity level of the womentargeted by the
law. Absent any other effects, the new law contributed towards the sustainability of social security.
However, it is possible that those firms that held these targeted women in their workforces adjusted
their personnel policies, namely in terms of their pay, hirings and separations.
6. THE IMPACT UPON WAGES AND HOURS WORKED
6.1. Treatment and control groups
Strictly speaking, the new law affected all women aged 62 or less. However, the law affected some
women more immediately than others, in such a way that one can expect that those women played a
largerrolein the consequencesof the reform. Amongstsuchwomen,onecanincludethosethat would
haveretiredint+1 iftheLARhadbeenunchangedatt. Forinstance,womenaged[60;60.5)bytheend
of 1992wouldhaveretiredin 1994underthe oldLAR (62); however, as LAR increasedto 62.5 bythen,
these women had to postpone their retirement to 1995. All women aged [55; 60.5) at the end of 1992
hadto postponetheirretirementduringtheperiod1994-1999(1999beingtheyearinwhichLARswere
equalised for the two genders). Those women will correspond to our treatment group. Table 1 de-
scribes as different age groups in 1992 were affected differently by the law throughout the period in
which the LAR converged completely.
The control group is composed of men at the same age as the womenincludedin the treatment group.
The LAR for men was already 65 when the new law became effective in the 1994-1999 period. There-
fore, the twogroups arecomparablein this agedimension.On the otherhand,it is clearthat the choice
of this control group can raise questions in terms of the comparabilityacross genders. Such a problem
is, however, mitigated to the extent that one is willingto accept the hypothesisof time invariance of the
difference-in-differences estimator. In other words, if the differences across the two genders are con-
stant throughout the period under analysis, then focusing on men as the counterfactual for women is
no longer an issue. In fact, the data support this hypothesis: between1991 and 1993, the difference in
the logarithm of wages between men and women was 0.39, 0.39 and 0.38, respectively, and 0.098,
0.093 and 0.100 for the logarithm of hours worked. We therefore conclude that our control group is a
legitimate one.
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(2) The results reported are obtainedfrom the coefficient identifyingthe impact of the treatment in a multivariatelogit model. See Pedro Martins, Álvaro Novo
andPedroPortugal,2007,“Increasingthelegalretirementage:Theimpactonworkers’wages,hours,workerflowsandfirm performance”,mimeo, Banco
de Portugal. 2222 2
(3) As a benchmark, the activity rate of women aged 15-64 is around 61.5% in the same period. For women aged 55-64, the activity rate in 1992 was 35.5%
(66.2%formen),increasingto41.8%(64.4%)in2000.Thedifference-in-differencesmethodcontrolsforthedifferenceinthetimetrendsthatareobserved
prior to the years in which the new law was introduced.In order to implement the difference-in-differences method, one also needs to define the “before” and
“after” periods. One should bear in mind that, beginning in 1994, women’s LAR increased six months
for each civil year, up to 65 in 1999. Therefore, there are two obvious choices for the “before” period:
1992 and 1993. Our preference for 1992 is based on the fact that the new law was promulgated in
1993, so that some individuals and firms may have reacted before 1994, for instance through early re-
tirement procedures; moreover, the government policy was not known in 1992, thus making it less
likely that individuals’ behaviour was affected on that year.
6.2. The mean individual impact of the increase in LAR
Given the non-experimental nature of the event under analysis, we begin by focusing our attention on
the qualityof the matching procedure, whichis crucial for the validityof the reported effects. As argued
previously, this is particularly important in a non-experimental environment, which in the present case
is evenmore important giventhe genderdifferences.In orderto assess the qualityof the matching,Ta-
ble2 reports the meanvaluefor a set of variables(characteristics)usedin orderto estimate the partici-
pation probability (i.e. to be targeted by the new law). One can expect that, before the matching, there
are (statistical) differences between the treatment and control groups. In fact, the first lines in Table 2
confirm that there are differences between the two groups.
4 One should notice that, after the control
groupunits arerestrictedto thoseshare(underastatisticalmetric)thesameprobabilityof participation
upon treatment, the differences disappear and one cannot any longer find any differences in the mean
characteristics between the two groups. This procedure ensures that the comparability of the two
groups was achieved, so that one can attribute any differences in behaviour to the impact of the treat-
ment. There may still be differences in unobserved variables, but these will also be eliminated
(controlledfor), in this case bythe difference-in-differencesmethod,assumingthose are constant over
the period under analysis.
Table 3 presents a new set of DDM estimates concerning the effects of the new law upon the group of
women targeted in terms of their pay and hours worked. The global assessment of the results sug-
gests that the impact of the increase in the LAR is very weakin terms of these labour market variables.
In statistical terms, none of the estimated impacts concerning wages and hours worked is significant,
while in economic terms the impact is also very minor.
Choosing men as a counterfactual comparison group may raise some criticism. In order to assess the
sensitivity of the estimates to the definition of the control group, we consider two alternative control
groups. The most obvious choice for the control group would be a comparison of women with other
women. However, this is problematic, as any woman aged less than 62 in 1993 was affected by the
new LAR. In this context, a natural choice would be to consider as a control group those women aged
above62in1993andthatarestillemployedalthoughtheywerealreadyentitledtoretirewithafullpen-
sion under the earlier law. Yet another choice would be to take into account as the control group those
women that were not forced to postpone their retirement from 1994 to 1999, although this may raise
endogeneityissues. The last twocolumns in Table 3 present our results. The conclusions do not seem
to depend on the specific definition of the control group. Neither pay nor hours workedare significantly
affected by the postponement of the retirement age.
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Source: Quadros de Pessoal, with authors’ computations.
Notes:Unmatched: Thereported valuesusethetotalsampleofindividualsbefore thematching procedure. Matched: Thereported valuesfortreatment andcontrolgroups useonlyindi-
vidualsmatchedintheprobabilityofparticipatingintreatment(usingthekernelmatchingalgorithm).Thistableomitsthevalueforthedummyvariableforsectorofactivityanddistrict.(a)A
p-value greater than 0.05 indicates that the difference of average value between the two groups is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 2
AVERAGE CHARACTERISTIC VALUES FOR SAMPLE BEFORE AND AFTER MATCHING PROCEDURE
Group
Variable Sample Treatment Control p-value
(a)
Experience Unmatched 52.44 52.19 0.000
Matched 52.43 52.34 0.163
Experience
2 Unmatched 2759.2 2734.4 0.000
Matched 2758.4 2749.3 0.162
Tenure Unmatched 15.58 17.80 0.000
Matched 15.60 15.51 0.704
Tenure
2 Unmatched 381.6 484.9 0.000
Matched 382.4 382.5 0.994
Sales (in logs) Unmatched 7.02 7.78 0.000
Matched 7.03 7.09 0.227
Education
High school Unmatched 0.03 0.03 0.093
Matched 0.03 0.04 0.739
College degree Unmatched 0.03 0.04 0.001
Matched 0.03 0.03 0.402
Year
1994 Unmatched 0.17 0.18 0.191
Matched 0.17 0.16 0.471
1995 Unmatched 0.20 0.20 0.603
Matched 0.20 0.20 0.765
1996 Unmatched 0.14 0.15 0.006
Matched 0.14 0.14 0.746
1997 Unmatched 0.18 0.17 0.071
Matched 0.18 0.18 0.824
1998 Unmatched 0.15 0.14 0.246
Matched 0.15 0.15 0.818
1999 Unmatched 0.17 0.16 0.107
Matched 0.17 0.17 0.909
Table 3
LABOR MARKET IMPACT: WAGES AND HOURS WORKED
Variable Men Women +62 years Women [50, 55]
Log(Wages) 0.008 -0.023 -0.003
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011)
10 204 4 953 6 788
Log(Hours worked) 0.009 0.006 -0.010
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009)
9 823 5 041 6 850
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, with authors’ computations.
Notes: The reported values for each variable are: point estimate, standard deviation (in parentheses) and number of observations. The estimation method is difference-in-differences
matching for longitudinal data. The treatment group consists of women that in 1992 belonged to the age group [57.5, 60.5). The control groups consist of, respectively, men in the same
age group, women aged 62 or more years old and women aged 50 to 55 years old in 1992.7. THE IMPACT UPON PERSONNEL POLICIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Althoughthenewlawhadanimmediateimpact upontheincreaseinfemalelaboursupply, asdrivenby
the extension of the range of ages in which women are active, it is important to assess any effects in
terms of firms’labourdemandandproductiondecisions.Oneareaof particularinterestconcernsfirms’
personnelpolicies,namelyhiringsand separations/firings.In fact, the increasein the LAR, in a context
of severe restrictions to the adjustment of employment levels – as is abundantly known for the Portu-
guese case – may significantly block the flow of workers.
7.1. Treatment and control groups
In order to examine separations, hirings and the net flow of workers at the firm level, we considered as
the treatment group the set of firms that employed at least one female worker aged [55; 60.5) in 1992.
Once the control group firms are identified – those that did not employ any woman in that age group -,
the effect of the new law was assessed over a period of five years. In other words, the estimates of the
effects of the newlawin terms of hirings (or other flows)are based upon the sum of all hirings (or other
flows) observed between 1994 and 1999.
7.2. Mean impact of the increase in the LAR upon firms
As before, the comparison between treatment and control group firms is established by drawing on a
matching method based on the probability that each firm belongs to the treatment group. These esti-
mates are then used in order to establish the matching between treatment group firms and those con-
trol groups firms that most closely resemble the former. This method seeks to restrict the comparison
betweenthe twogroups to a set of firms that are effectivelycomparable in terms of a desirablylong set
of observed characteristics. The variables considered for the matching include the firm size, five quali-
tative variables for different firm size categories, the percentage of female workers,the mean total sal-
ary, the meanhoursof work,the percentageof workersthat aremenaged60or above,the percentage
of the equity of the firm held by foreign investors and by domestic private investors, 57 qualitative vari-
ablesfor differentindustriesand29qualitativevariablesreferringto thegeographicalunits inwhichthe
firms are located.
5
From the estimation of the mean effect of the increase of the LAR, it is found that the accumulated ef-
fect over the five years (1994-1999) lead to a retention of about 1.6 workers by the treatment-group
firms (whichemployed,on average,1.2 womenaffected bythe law).This fall in the levelof separations
inducedadecreaseof 2.6hirings(seeTable4). From thejointeffect of thechangeintheseflows,there
is a net loss of one employeewhenone compares the evolutionof the level of employmentin the treat-
mentgroupfirmswiththeequivalentevolutioninthecontrolgroupfirms.Thereductioninhiringsispar-
ticularly strong amongst younger workers, particularly females. From the decomposition of the hiring
flows it is found that about two thirds of the decrease in hirings affected women aged 25 or less (see
Martins, Novo and Portugal, 2007).
There is also evidence of a slight but significant decrease in the level of sales in firms that employed
workersaffected bythe increasein the LAR, oncea comparisonwiththe equivalentchangein the level
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(5) Some variables are includedas polynomialsof the second or third degree. The data set includes only firms with less than 100 employees, since it proved
particularly difficult to find large firms that did not employ a single woman worker affected by the new law.of sales is established (Table 4). This result may be interpreted as a consequence of a scale effect in
production related to the increase in labour costs unleashed by the forced retention of older female
workers. However, this result may not have consequences in terms of the average firm productivity,
whencalculatedas the ratio betweensales and firm size, since firm size has also fallen. All in all, these
results seem to be consistent withthe evidencethat the firms affected did not allowthat the increase in
the LRA affected their decision regarding their wage bills.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This essaystudiedthe microeconomicimpact of the increaseinthe legalretirementageof womenthat
took place in September 1993, using statistical techniques that allow one to establish an appropriate
comparisonbetweenthe treatment groupand a groupof individualsthat exhibitsimilar characteristics,
except that they were not affected by the new law (the control group).
While evidence that the new law was binding is obtained, based on the result of a significant increase
in the employment rate of women aged between 62 and 65, there is no evidence that wages or hours
worked changed.
However, the increase in the legal retirement age decreased significantly the hiring of new workers,
particularly young women. Over an horizon of five years, for each female worker affected by the in-
crease in the retirement age, up to two newworkerswerenot hired as a consequence. There wasalso
evidence that the level of sales fell, while average sales per worker has not changed, since net job
creation was also negative.
The evidence about a net loss of employment amongst the firms affected may imply, absent any gen-
eral equilibrium effects that counteract upon the decrease in hirings, that the positive effect upon the
sustainabilityof social security may have been attenuated by a decrease in the amount of social secu-
rity revenues and by an increase in the amount of unemployment benefits for younger workers.
In the institutional setting of the Portuguese labour market, stimulating employmentamongst the older
workers(“active ageing”) maybe, in part, counteracted bythe rigidityof the wagedeterminationmech-
anisms,especiallythroughthe widespreadusageof tenure-relatedpayincreases,andbyemployment
protection, which in the Portuguese case corresponds to the high firing costs.
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Table 4
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT ON TREATED FIRMS: WORKERS FLOW, SALES AND SALES PER WORKER
Number of observations






Hiring (number of workers) 1995-99 -2.59 0.49 4048 40197
Separations (number of workers) 1995-99 -1.64 0.40 4048 40197
Net job creation (number of workers) 1995-99 -0.95 0.25 4048 40197
Sales (thousands of euros) 1995-99 -12.63 2.74 5310 57330
Sales per worker (thousands of euros) 1995-99 -0.04 0.17 5359 57104
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 1991 to 1999 with authors’ computations.
Note: Point estimates based on difference-in-differences matching with kernel matching.REFERENCES
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